Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents (Record no. 57618)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 03933nam a22004935i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 978-1-4614-6319-1
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20200421112225.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 130125s2013 xxu| s |||| 0|eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
ISBN 9781461463191
-- 978-1-4614-6319-1
082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Call Number 621.382
100 1# - AUTHOR NAME
Author Kakhbod, Ali.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents
Sub Title An Implementation Theory Approach /
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Number of Pages XVII, 88 p.
490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT
Series statement Springer Theses, Recognizing Outstanding Ph.D. Research,
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Remark 2 I Introduction -- II Implementation Theory -- III Unicast Service Provisioning -- IV Power Allocation and Spectrum Sharing in Multi-user, Multi- channel Systems -- V Multi-rate Multicast Service Provisioning -- VI Summary and Future Directions -- Appendices.
520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems.  Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents'  utilities.  Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process.  Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis.  The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field.
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-6319-1
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type eBooks
264 #1 -
-- New York, NY :
-- Springer New York :
-- Imprint: Springer,
-- 2013.
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-- text
-- txt
-- rdacontent
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-- computer
-- c
-- rdamedia
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-- online resource
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-- text file
-- PDF
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650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Engineering.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Computer organization.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Electrical engineering.
650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Law and economics.
650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Engineering.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Communications Engineering, Networks.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks.
650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1
-- Law and Economics.
830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE
-- 2190-5053
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-- ZDB-2-ENG

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