Multiagent systems : algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations / Yoav Shoham, Kevin Leyton-Brown.
By: Shoham, Yoav [author.].
Contributor(s): Leyton-Brown, Kevin [author.].
Material type: BookPublisher: Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009Description: 1 online resource (xx, 483 pages) : digital, PDF file(s).Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9780511811654 (ebook).Subject(s): Intelligent agents (Computer software) | Electronic data processing -- Distributed processingAdditional physical formats: Print version: : No titleDDC classification: 006.3 Online resources: Click here to access onlineTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).
Distributed constraint satisfaction -- Distributed optimization -- Introduction to noncooperative game theory: games in normal form -- Computing solution concepts of normal-form games -- Games with sequential actions: reasoning and computing with the extensive form -- Richer representations: beyond the normal and extensive forms -- Learning and teaching -- Communication -- Aggregating preferences: social choice -- Protocols for strategic agents: mechanism design -- Protocols for multiagent resource allocation: auctions -- Teams of selfish agents: an introduction to coalitional game theory -- Logics of knowledge and relief -- Beyond belief: probability, dynamics, and intention.
Multiagent systems combine multiple autonomous entities, each having diverging interests or different information. This overview of the field offers a computer science perspective, but also draws on ideas from game theory, economics, operations research, logic, philosophy and linguistics. It will serve as a reference for researchers in each of these fields, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming.
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