000 | 03027nam a22005415i 4500 | ||
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001 | 978-3-642-35822-7 | ||
003 | DE-He213 | ||
005 | 20200420211747.0 | ||
007 | cr nn 008mamaa | ||
008 | 130404s2013 gw | s |||| 0|eng d | ||
020 |
_a9783642358227 _9978-3-642-35822-7 |
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024 | 7 |
_a10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7 _2doi |
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050 | 4 | _aHD30.23 | |
072 | 7 |
_aKJT _2bicssc |
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072 | 7 |
_aKJMD _2bicssc |
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072 | 7 |
_aBUS049000 _2bisacsh |
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082 | 0 | 4 |
_a658.40301 _223 |
100 | 1 |
_a�Cetiner, Demet. _eauthor. |
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245 | 1 | 0 |
_aFair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances _h[electronic resource] / _cby Demet �Cetiner. |
264 | 1 |
_aBerlin, Heidelberg : _bSpringer Berlin Heidelberg : _bImprint: Springer, _c2013. |
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300 |
_aXV, 168 p. 27 illus. _bonline resource. |
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336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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_acomputer _bc _2rdamedia |
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_aonline resource _bcr _2rdacarrier |
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_atext file _bPDF _2rda |
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490 | 1 |
_aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, _x0075-8442 ; _v668 |
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505 | 0 | _aIntroduction -- Selected Topics in Revenue Management -- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances -- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game -- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances -- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances -- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices -- Conclusion and Future Research -- Appendix: Computational Study. | |
520 | _aA major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods. | ||
650 | 0 | _aBusiness. | |
650 | 0 | _aProduction management. | |
650 | 0 | _aOperations research. | |
650 | 0 | _aDecision making. | |
650 | 0 | _aManagement science. | |
650 | 0 | _aGame theory. | |
650 | 1 | 4 | _aBusiness and Management. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aOperation Research/Decision Theory. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aOperations Research, Management Science. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aGame Theory. |
650 | 2 | 4 | _aOperations Management. |
710 | 2 | _aSpringerLink (Online service) | |
773 | 0 | _tSpringer eBooks | |
776 | 0 | 8 |
_iPrinted edition: _z9783642358210 |
830 | 0 |
_aLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, _x0075-8442 ; _v668 |
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856 | 4 | 0 | _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7 |
912 | _aZDB-2-SBE | ||
942 | _cEBK | ||
999 |
_c51035 _d51035 |