Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances (Record no. 51035)
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| 000 -LEADER | |
|---|---|
| fixed length control field | 03027nam a22005415i 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER | |
| control field | 978-3-642-35822-7 |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION | |
| control field | 20200420211747.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION | |
| fixed length control field | 130404s2013 gw | s |||| 0|eng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
| ISBN | 9783642358227 |
| -- | 978-3-642-35822-7 |
| 082 04 - CLASSIFICATION NUMBER | |
| Call Number | 658.40301 |
| 100 1# - AUTHOR NAME | |
| Author | �Cetiner, Demet. |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT | |
| Title | Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION | |
| Number of Pages | XV, 168 p. 27 illus. |
| 490 1# - SERIES STATEMENT | |
| Series statement | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, |
| 505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE | |
| Remark 2 | Introduction -- Selected Topics in Revenue Management -- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances -- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game -- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances -- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances -- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices -- Conclusion and Future Research -- Appendix: Computational Study. |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. | |
| Summary, etc | A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods. |
| 856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS | |
| Uniform Resource Identifier | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7 |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) | |
| Koha item type | eBooks |
| 264 #1 - | |
| -- | Berlin, Heidelberg : |
| -- | Springer Berlin Heidelberg : |
| -- | Imprint: Springer, |
| -- | 2013. |
| 336 ## - | |
| -- | text |
| -- | txt |
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| 337 ## - | |
| -- | computer |
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| -- | rdamedia |
| 338 ## - | |
| -- | online resource |
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| 347 ## - | |
| -- | text file |
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| -- | rda |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Business. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Production management. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Operations research. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Decision making. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Management science. |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Game theory. |
| 650 14 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Business and Management. |
| 650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Operation Research/Decision Theory. |
| 650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Operations Research, Management Science. |
| 650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Game Theory. |
| 650 24 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--SUBJECT 1 | |
| -- | Operations Management. |
| 830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE | |
| -- | 0075-8442 ; |
| 912 ## - | |
| -- | ZDB-2-SBE |
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