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Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances [electronic resource] / by Demet �Cetiner.

By: �Cetiner, Demet [author.].
Contributor(s): SpringerLink (Online service).
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookSeries: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems: 668Publisher: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg : Imprint: Springer, 2013Description: XV, 168 p. 27 illus. online resource.Content type: text Media type: computer Carrier type: online resourceISBN: 9783642358227.Subject(s): Business | Production management | Operations research | Decision making | Management science | Game theory | Business and Management | Operation Research/Decision Theory | Operations Research, Management Science | Game Theory | Operations ManagementAdditional physical formats: Printed edition:: No titleDDC classification: 658.40301 Online resources: Click here to access online
Contents:
Introduction -- Selected Topics in Revenue Management -- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances -- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game -- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances -- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances -- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices -- Conclusion and Future Research -- Appendix: Computational Study.
In: Springer eBooksSummary: A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
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Introduction -- Selected Topics in Revenue Management -- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances -- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game -- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances -- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances -- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices -- Conclusion and Future Research -- Appendix: Computational Study.

A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.

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